Period of Engineering Prominence -- Rank of Barge Canal as an Engineering Feat -- Engineering Problems the Results of Social, Economic or Industrial Questions -- Project Started Expeditiously but Cautiously -- Construction on an Enormous Task -- The year 1904 One of Manifold and Far-Reaching Activities -- Advisory Board of Consulting Engineers Appointed -- Mr. Van Alstyne Succeeds Mr. Bond as State Engineer -- Standard Specifications Carefully Prepared -- Radical Change in Classification of Excavated Material -- Boat Design to Prove Canal Capacity -- Test Contracts to Ascertain Probable Total Cost -- Characteristics of Test Sections -- First Bids Show Prospective Saving -- Lump Sum and Itemized Bids Asked at First Letting -- Question Raised as to Concrete or Stone Masonry -- Investigations and Report on Masonry Practice in Middle West and South -- Studies for Making Changes in Canal Route: Tonawanda-Lockport Level: Lockport-Rochester Level: At Medina: Genesee River Crossing: At Rome: At Utica: Waterford Land Line -- Study for Movable Dams -- Study Extended to Europe -- Bridge Type of Dam Adopted -- Study for Changing Route near Savannah -- A Longer Change and Enlargement of Cayuga and Seneca Canal Involved -- Survey to Cayuga Lake Made -- Influence of Cayuga and Seneca Agitation on Main Line Change -- Route Changed by Legislative Amendment, Fox Ridge to Macedon -- Another Amendment Allows Change of Lock Dimensions -- Lock Dimensions Fixed -- Provision for Future Channel Widening -- Study for Securing Federal Aid, Troy to Waterford -- Numerous Findings of Study -- Advisory Board to Continue During Construction -- Terminals Suggested -- Certain Bridges Changed to Bascule Type.

Through many pages we have been considering the affairs in which the canal advocate and the legislator played the major parts. We now come to the time when the engineer had his day, and a rather long day it has been as time is measured, but to the historian who would make his recital something more than a record of technical achievements, however absorbing that may be to the engineer, this whole period seems somewhat lacking in outstanding events or in matters of any wide-spread popular interest. To make this chapter more interesting the topics discussed are confined chiefly to those which concern policies adopted or methods pursued.

Chronologically we have now nearly reached the period of canal construction, but the present chapter, as has just been said, does not deal with that phase of the undertaking. It has seemed best to segregate the events or subjects which have to do mainly with the actual work of construction and place them in chronological order in a chapter by themselves. To do this logically two other chapters must intervene, since construction on the Erie, Champlain and Oswego canals and on the Cayuga and Seneca canal after that branch was included and then on the terminals after they were added was all progressing at the same time, and a description of building operations on the parts added to the project would be out of place until after the accounts of their inception.

The average engineer is not much in the public eye. He is engrossed in his own work and takes his delight chiefly in knowing that he has solved difficult problems and accomplished great deeds, not caring much what others, aside from his brother engineers, may know or think. The average engineering problem also, like the engineer, is not much in the public eye. Perhaps from its technical character this is necessarily so. Possibly too the engineer's attitude may have something to do with it. If he took the public more into his confidence, doubtless many persons would show greater interest in engineering attainments and deeper appreciation of their importance.

As an engineering project the Barge canal ranks at the top of the world's accomplishments. Its contemporaneous undertaking, the Panama canal, has overshadowed it in public esteem, especially in America, but we have no hesitancy in saying that, because of its more numerous and multifarious structures, its problems, much greater in number and more difficult, its greater length, and its construction through a highly developed and populous territory amid the restrictions of public and private commercial interest, vested rights and legal entanglements -- because of these characteristics and conditions, we have no hesitancy in saying that the engineering world in general ascribes to the Barge canal a higher technical rank that to the Panama canal. Foreign engineers surely recognize the standing of the Barge canal and many have been their pilgrimages to view it, some choosing to see its structures in preference to visiting the Isthmian waterway.

Since the Barge canal has this engineering side as well as its commercial, economic and political sides, and since the engineering aspect occupies so conspicuous a position and constitutes so much of the canal history, we feel that, as we proceed with the account of canal construction, we must from time to time enter upon the discussion of a few strictly engineering features. We need not go deeply into technicalities -- a volume of plans dealing exclusively with this phase of the subject has recently been published -- but to understand why various policies have been adopted we must know something of the engineering problems that have dictated them.

Then, too, since the engineering problems were so closely connected with, or perhaps it would be better to say, were the results of various social, economic or industrial questions, we view them not merely as technical achievements but as explanations of certain phases of growth and development. Thus at the very beginning of Barge canal planning we shall see how the question of using concrete for its large structures was involved in the life of certain labor organizations and evidenced the passing of a long-established trade; how the adoption of movable dams affected the welfare of riverside communities and indicated an important advance in engineering knowledge; how a proposed betterment prevented interference with the business interests of a thriving village and eventually, together with other causes, added a new branch to the enlarged canal system; how the widening of locks put the State in a better position to cope with its rival, Canada; how a study of canalizing the Hudson brought Federal aid; how a new provision in the specifications tended toward the attainment of justice and the elimination of fraud; how deviations of route affected such localities as Rochester, Rome, Utica and other places; and later we shall see how on the question of terminals hung the success of the whole canal and also much of the prosperity of the State.

Perhaps it has been noticed that in the preceding pages we have been rather chary in using the term Barge canal. Up to the time when the people authorized a particular type of canal there were various schemes of improvement which were under consideration and in treating of that period it seemed wiser to use as distinctive terms as possible; the phrase 1,000-ton canal appeared better to describe the main project. But hereafter we may use the term Barge canal and feel certain of not being misunderstood. As a matter of fact the name had come into popular use long before the time we have mentioned. Since it has come now to be the accepted appellation of one particular canal system, we shall use a capital letter in spelling it. Moreover, we shall employ the term often according to a very common use -- as a generic title -- to include all four of the separate branches of the system.

We have seen something of the intense feeling that had been aroused on both sides in the contest for the Barge canal. But now that the people had ordered its building they expected that the work would be pushed to completion as soon as possible. It was needful, therefore, for those in authority to advance with speed but with extreme caution withal. The defeated opponents, as well as plenty of the friends also for that matter, were only too ready to condemn if aught went wrong. Then too there was the memory of the nine-million experience fresh in the minds of everybody. The State Engineer appreciated the temper of the people and began his work within a very few days after the official count of the vote. The State Board of Canvassers does not meet until a little before the middle of December, but by the fifteenth of that month the engineers had begun their operations and soon afterward plans for a carefully-organized engineering task force were being carried out.

The task imposed by the people, that of building the Barge canal, was gigantic; how vast an amount of labor it has involved can be realized only by those who have been through the whole of it. And the chief burden rested on the State Engineer, the major portion of all the labor and of the responsibility also devolving upon him. His was the duty of making the plans and then of seeing that the work of construction was done properly and in accordance with those plans; his was the task of gathering all necessary information, drawing conclusions from the data in hand, deciding what to do, and then going ahead and doing it. To be sure there were the Canal Board and various officials who in a way shared that burden, but the work was mainly one of engineering and naturally most of the questions that arose fell to the lot of the State Engineer, and so it was that others in authority were guided by and placed chief dependence upon his opinion; moreover, if anything had gone amiss he would have had to bear the blame. He had able counselors, however in the members of the Advisory Board and he was privileged to employ a number of expert assistants.

If the average engineer is not greatly concerned with public acclaim, neither is he prone to make much ado about his difficulties, regarding them simply as part of his day's work. So with the project we are studying. Little was said to let people know that it rivaled the world's greatest deeds, that some untrodden fields were being entered, that the safety of cities and villages and the lives of their citizens depended on the proper planning of structures, that untold watchfulness was constantly necessary to guard the State's interests, or that a hundred and one troublesome problems were daily crying for solution.

Although the engineers had begun their work by December 15, 1903, it was not until the spring of 1905 that the first contracts were awarded and the work of construction actually commenced. But the year 1904 was not one of idleness, far from it. In spite of all the preliminary examinations, much additional information had to be acquired and new surveys of practically the whole line of the canal had to be made. An organization to endure for a decade or more and suited to handle an unusually large enterprise had to be perfected. Rules and instructions for conducting all the many kinds of work had to be formulated. And in all the contract plans made, not only in that year but also in the next year or two, the whole project had to be considered, since these first contracts were setting precedents and fixing standards.

As one reviews the records of that first year of canal planning, the feature which stands out preëminent amid the manifold activities is the painstaking care and thoroughness with which the project was undertaken. With so enormous an enterprise in prospect no one could afford to make mistakes at the beginning. The nine-foot deepening was a lamentable example of work rushed into without due forethought or sufficient preparation and its warning was being heeded.

On March 3, 1904, Governor Odell, under the authority given him by the Barge canal law, appointed "five expert civil engineers to act as an Advisory Board of Consulting Engineers." These were, Edward A. Bond, William A. Brackenridge, Dr. Elmer L. Corthell, Commander Alfred Brooks Fry and Col. Thomas W. Symons. We have already mentioned Mr. Bond and Col. Symons many times. Mr. Bond had then entered upon his sixth year as State Engineer. The other three were well-known engineers. Mr. Brackenridge had had large experience in water-power installation, Dr. Corthell enjoyed an international reputation and Commander Fry had been prominent in Government service.

By reason of Mr. Bond's new position as chairman of the Advisory Board and his subsequent resignation as State Engineer the latter office became vacant. On May 10 the Governor appointed Henry A. Van Alstyne to fill out the unexpired term as State Engineer. Mr. Van Alstyne had been serving as Division Engineer of the Eastern Division for about three years and before than had been Assistant Engineer and Resident Engineer for several years and was well acquainted with State engineering work. Two days later the new State Engineer appointed Henry C. Allen to be Special Deputy State Engineer, the office created by the Barge canal law for supplying an engineer who should have direct charge of the whole Barge canal project. Mr. Van Alstyne served as State Engineer until January 1, 1907, being elected in the fall of 1904 for a regular term of two years, and upon him and his Special Deputy, Mr. Allen, rested the responsibility of Barge canal operations until 1907. For the five months of work up to Mr. Allen's appointment William B. Landreth. Resident Engineer of the Eastern Division, had been in charge under the State Engineer.

The care attending the Barge canal work, especially the early stages of it, is seen particularly in the specifications. Any contract of course has its own individual specifications, but the large majority of items are common to many contracts and can be put in standard form, and it was these standard specifications that were then engaging the thoughts of the engineers. After their preparation by the State Engineer's corps these specifications were submitted to both the Advisory Board and the Canal Board and there subjected to careful revision. Upon points involving any legal questions the Attorney-General's suggestions were followed. No efforts were spared to make the specifications as clearly understandable and as perfect as possible. There were some departures from the practices theretofore prevailing on State work, notably the classification of excavated material. This was a very important and somewhat radical change and one that resulted from certain experiences we noted in our earlier study of the subject. The new specifications required all excavation of whatever nature to be done under one classification and for one price. This arrangement probably did not result in any financial advantage to the State, but it did militate toward the minimizing of trouble, for it is through differences of opinion as to the proper classification of excavated materials, when a specification makes provision for classification, that the most serious controversies on contract work arise and the chief opportunity for wrong-doing is presented. It was largely this difference in the specifications of the nine-million improvement that laid that whole project open to the charge of fraud. State Engineer Van Alstyne believed that by the elimination of every question relative to classification the greatest obstacle to a successful and clean administration of work had been removed. To offset the element of uncertainty in this method of procedure careful borings were made upon the sites of contracts, a knowledge of the probable character of materials being thus obtained and the records of these tests and the samples taken in the borings being kept and exhibited to prospective bidders.

In another matter the State Engineer showed the care with which he was proceeding. In all the preliminary studies it had been assumed that a barge of 1,000 tons capacity could be accommodated in the locks which it was planned to build, but no detailed plans for such a boat had actually been made. In order to determine definitely the size and capacity of barges suitable for use in the prism and locks of the proposed new canal Mr. Van Alstyne obtained the services of Horace See, a naval architect of New York city, and requested him to design a barge and compute its carrying capacity. According to Mr. See's plans and accompanying report it appeared that a barge 150 feet long and 27 feet beam, when loaded to 10 feet draft, had a cargo capacity of 1,020 tons and that a power barge of like dimensions could carry 892 tons. As the law fixed the lock dimensions at 328 feet between hollow quoins and 28 feet clear width, it can readily be seen that a 1,000-ton barge could navigate the new canal and also that two such barges could be passed at one lockage.

One of the chief arguments directed against the proposed canal in the campaign which was just ended had been that the estimates were not reliable and that the project could not be completed within the sum appropriated. With this possibility in mind State Engineer Van Alstyne determined to ascertain with a fair degree of accuracy the probable cost of the whole improvement and for this purpose he selected eight sections of canal, well scattered over the whole state, each of which was typical of a particular class of work and all together embracing nearly all classes that would be encountered. Proposals from contractors for the work on these sections might reasonably be supposed to be a good index of the total cost.

Briefly we may enumerate these eight sections and describe the kind of work required at each locality. First there was the improvement of the Champlain canal from Northumberland to Fort Edward. Here there were a river channel and a land line prism to excavate and a dam, a lock and a guard-gate to build. The excavation was in soft rock and earth, both dry and under water, and besides the concrete structures there was timber work in docks and cribs. Two large locks at the Eastern end of the Erie canal constituted the second selection -- locks of the highest lift ever undertaken in the world at that time, embodying a great volume of concrete and requiring a large amount of earth and rock excavation in preparation. The third section embraced five miles of canal just east of Oneida lake, where a channel was to be dug through fine sand, suitable for a hydraulic dredge to handle, and several steel bridges and a breakwater into the lake were to be built. The fourth project contained material also suitable for a hydraulic dredge, the silt, marl and sand in six miles of canal across the Montezuma marshes. The fifth section included four miles of canal near Rochester, where there were a million and a half yards of hard rock to be excavated. For the sixth proposition there was chosen the enlarging of six miles of existing canal near Medina, typical of a long stretch of canal in the western part of the state, where earth and rock must be excavated during the winter season and minor structures were to be erected. The seventh selection was the improvement of the Tonawanda creek, which was to be widened and deepened through soft, wet soil. The eighth section was located in the city of Fulton on the Oswego canal. Here there were existing river dams to be raised, two locks to be constructed, rock to be excavated under water and structures to be built in the readjustment of private water-power interests. It may be said parenthetically that this eighth section, because of both natural obstacles and difficulties with the contractors, proved one of the most troublesome on the whole canal.

Before the year 1904 was gone contract plans had been prepared for the first five of the propositions we have just listed. These were contracts Nos. 1 to 6, inclusive, the first proposition having been divided into two contracts. On December 15, 16 and 17 proposals were received for these six pieces of work. The sum of the lowest bids amounted to $4,242,620. The appropriation carried by the law authorizing the canal, it will be remembered, was based on the State Engineer's revised estimate of 1903. The 1903 figures for the work included in these six contracts showed a total of $5,015,883. This was a prospective saving of $773,263, or 15.4 per cent. Since nearly all classes of work were embraced in these contracts and since tenders were received from a large number of contractors, hailing from many parts of the country, the result of this initial opening of the bids was looked upon by those in authority as a most favorable indication that the whole canal could be build well within the appropriation.

There was one fact connected with these bids which we should notice, since it would have been a radical innovation if it had gone through as planned and moreover it accounts for the delay in awarding these first contracts. By resolution the Canal Board had directed that each bidder be asked to state a lump sum for which he would do the entire work embraced within the contract, in addition to submitting a bid composed of unit prices for the various items of work. As introduced this resolution made it obligatory on the bidder to submit both forms of proposal, but before passing the Board it was amended and merely requested both lump sum and itemized bids. When these first tenders were opened there appeared only two lump sum bids on each of three contracts and in all cases the lump sum bids were higher that the lowest of the itemized proposals.

The legality of this procedure was seriously brought into question. The Barge canal law, it appeared, was silent in regard to receiving alternative proposals, but what was known as the general canal law (chapter 13 of the General Laws) forbade such bids, imposing upon anybody submitting more than one proposal on a single contract the penalty of rejecting all his bids. The task of awarding Barge canal contracts devolved by law upon the Superintendent of Public Works. The incumbent of the office at that time, Charles S. Boyd, felt it his duty to submit this question of legality to the Attorney-General, and also, since his term of office was about to end, he deemed it proper to leave the whole subject , including the award of contracts, to his successor. The outcome of this matter is told in the chapter on canal construction.

Early in Barge canal operations the engineers were called upon to decide a question which at that time loomed rather large -- whether concrete or stone masonry should be used in the new structures. This necessity arose, not because the engineers themselves doubted the wisdom of using concrete, as had been planned in the preliminary estimates, but because various interested labor organizations protested against its use. Delegates from these associations, representing stone-cutters, bricklayers and masons, appeared before both the Canal Board and the Advisory Board, praying for the substitution of stone masonry. Up to that time the State had not employed concrete to any great extent and indeed concrete had not yet taken its place in general use.

In the history of industrial development there has come many a time when some radical improvement has wiped out a whole trade and always the artisans of such handicraft have striven against the innovation. So it was now. Perhaps the members of these trades did not perceive the ultimate futility of their struggle, but they could see that such an enterprise as the Barge canal would abundantly lengthen the days of their occupation. It was the very largeness of the Barge canal project which precipitated the crisis at this time. Canal authorities appreciated the gravity of the situation and took considerable pains to show the wisdom of their choice.

With some show of reason the petitioners pointed to two conspicuous failures of large concrete structures in the state and they contended also that the climatic conditions in New York were inimical to the successful use of this material. Although New York State had not employed concrete much, its use on Federal works and in other parts of the country was becoming general practice. To ascertain the condition of these structures from personal inspection and also to advise with prominent engineers who were becoming expert in using concrete, William B. Landreth, who was then serving as Engineer-Secretary to the Advisory Board, made a trip through the Middle West and South in August 1904. He went into Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia and Pennsylvania, examining large works of concrete and conferring with engineers. The conclusions he arrived at, which were concurred in by the Advisory Board, are worth noting, since they effectually decided the question for the Barge canal.

"The conclusions reached by me," said Mr. Landreth in his written report, "after examination of the various works and from conversations with the several engineers are as follows:

"1. That concrete built of proper materials, well selected and carefully placed, has proved as strong and durable as cut-stone masonry.

"2. That its use in locks, dams, retaining walls, bridge piers and abutments, and in fact in all places where cut-stone masonry was formerly used, is becoming universal.

"3. That the cost of concrete masonry is from one-fourth to one-third that of cut stone.

"4. That work can be built of concrete much more expeditiously that of cut stone, owing to the great difficulty in preparing the stone as rapidly as needed for the work."

The examination extended as far north as Duluth, which is 275 miles farther north than the Erie canal and experiences much more severe winters than New York state. The estimated cost of substituting stone masonry for concrete in the Barge canal structures amounted to $16,100,432 and this fact had its due weight in deciding the issue.

The preliminary survey for the Barge canal had been conducted with as much care as was possible in the time available and on its results the general line of the canal and many details of construction had been definitely fixed for insertion in the law authorizing the work. Only within somewhat narrow limitations could the State Engineer or the Canal Board make any changes. By this means the framers of the law had sought to protect the State against the peradventure of undue expenditures or unscrupulous acts. But early in the studies for contract plans it appeared that by more extended investigations several possibilities of betterment might be found. We shall look at some of these studies. A few of them led to ultimate changes from the original plans, some with the necessity of amending the law and others by means of amendments.

Beginning at the western end of the Erie canal the first place for such improvement was the Tonawanda-Lockport level. Then proceeding east there were the Lockport-Rochester level, the gorge at Medina, the crossing of the Genesee river, the alignment near Savannah, the locations at Rome and Utica and the passage between the Hudson and Mohawk rivers. These studies all came in the first year's examinations. Going a little more into detail we learn that the change on the Tonawanda-Lockport level was one of altered elevation, lowering the level about four feet by doing away with a dam, thereby eliminating a lock and the feeder from Black Rock. The question on the 63-mile Lockport-Rochester level was also one of elevation. By raising this level three feet at Rochester and a little more than five feet (providing for surface slope) at Lockport a large saving in expense could be made. The gorge at Medina furnished one of the most interesting engineering problems on the whole line of the canal. Although its solution was attacked early in the first year, the construction here formed one of the last large contracts to be let. Upwards of a dozen separate sets of plans and estimates were made before the final scheme was reached. The possibility of avoiding a very objectionable loop by carrying the canal over the 400-foot gorge, 100 feet above its bottom, presented a very fertile field for investigation. We shall speak of these plans later. A consideration of the Genesee river crossing suggested the substitution of a movable for a fixed dam. Here was another location prolific of extended study. Because of its manifold problems and the difficulty of reaching agreement with the people of Rochester this was the last portion of the canal to be completed. The possibility of a new alignment near Savannah became involved subsequently in the question of adding the Cayuga and Seneca canal to the Barge canal system; its discussion will be reserved to a later time. At Rome the canal problem was intricately complicated by the railroads and much time and labor were needed for its solution, as we shall see later. Just prior to the adoption of the Barge canal project the city of Utica had begun a straightening of the Mohawk river north of the city in an attempt to regulate the stream. Now the people wanted the canal alignment changed by shifting it to the north, farther away from the city, so as to utilize the new channel. After careful consideration the State Engineer agreed to this idea and began his plans in accordance with it, but construction did not begin until five years later and by that time new elements had entered into the problem and had thrown the alignment still farther north, almost to the edge of the valley. Near the eastern end of the Erie canal there is an almost abrupt descent of considerable height into the Hudson river valley. The Mohawk makes this drop over the Cohoes falls. The old Erie canal made it by means of its "sixteens," that trial of the old canaler, sixteen locks in close proximity. The original Erie canal made a partial failure of its attempt to pass this declivity, the locks being so near together that frequent lockages drained the short levels between the locks and grounded the boats, and during those early days the lockages were frequent , for the traffic was large and the boats were small and they were plying on the canal in vast numbers. The territory in the vicinity of the falls had been frequently surveyed but not until the studies of 1904 did it occur to anybody to utilize a natural depression that extended a good part of the way between the Hudson and the Mohawk. The new location at once commended itself and was speedily adopted. Along this stretch of about two miles and a half there has been constructed a section of canal which is abounding in features of especial interest to the engineer, the main attraction being the greatest series of high lift locks in the world, five locks elevating boats through a height of 169 feet.

Another study that was begun in 1904 resulted in substituting dams of the movable type in the Mohawk and eventually at two other localities for the timber, rock-filled dams of fixed type as originally planned. This was a question which involved more than engineering problems; it was one which at certain critical periods vitally affected the well-being of communities along the Mohawk. Because of its remarkable endowment by Nature to become the principal thoroughfare between the Atlantic coast and the interior of the continent, the valley of the Mohawk has become a well-populated region and one of high commercial development. This was the avenue of travel and transport used by the Indian long before the coming of the European. This was the route along which the white man established his trading posts, that later grew into hamlets, and here he made his first attempt to open water communication with the great inland lakes. The original Erie canal turned these hamlets and lonely frontier cabins into thriving cities and flourishing villages and soon the railways came to increase the prosperity, so that today the Mohawk is lined with valuable farm, village or city property, where is heard the hum of industry, and each bank of the river carries its great railroad. Any change which might increase the height or the frequency of floods in a territory like this was a menace to life and property and a grave hindrance to successful business, and such menace the fixed dam would have been.

The fixed dam, the dam of all the past ages, as unchangeable as the centuries it has served, holds back its water to minimum level at all times and functions well during the normal stages of a stream, but in periods of flood its presence may be decidedly objectionable. The movable dam, on the other hand, as its name implies, may be removed from a stream as occasion requires. This type of dam appeared first about ninety years ago, has been devised in many forms, and either is built in sections which in the form of gates, wickets or smaller "needles," as they are termed, may severally be raised above the water-surface or be entirely removed, or is constructed as a crest that by some means may be lowered into a recess below the bed of the stream.

During 1904 the studies of the Mohawk river had led to the conclusion that some form of movable dam must be adopted for the successful canalization of the stream, but what type to use did not then appear. By this means it would be possible to control floods and ice outflows to the extent at least of restoring natural conditions. Complete flood control, however, required more than such regulating dam -- reservoir storage chiefly. But these dams would be a help to keep the river from being the "ungovernable thing" of which Benjamin Franklin wrote and tend to make it "quiet and manageable."

A little later the study of movable dams was undertaken with more care, with the view to determine definitely what kind to use. A man who had had considerable experience in such work, David A. Watt, was secured to supervise the making of plans, and existing movable dams were inspected in both America and Europe. Mr. Watt visited in Europe canal structures on the lower and upper Seine, the Yonne, the Marne, the Oise, the Saône, the Rhone, the Po, the Danube, the Moldau, the Elbe, the Spree, the Main, the Ems, the Rhine and the Thames. Not only were movable dams inspected but whatever information was available that seemed applicable to the Barge canal Mr. Watt brought back with him.

The style of dam adopted was known as the bridge type with Boulé gates. This seemed best to satisfy the prime requisites -- certainty and simplicity of operation. A good example of this kind had been found at Mirowicz, Bohemia, on the Moldau river, a dam completed in 1904.

These dams, as they now appear in the Mohawk, seem to be bridges with abutments and piers. From the downstream side of the lower chord hang steel frames with heavy upright pieces 15 feet apart, upon which slide an upper and a lower tier of rectangular steel plates, called gates. When serving as a dam the bottoms of the lower gates rest on a concrete sill in the river bed, the tops of the upper gates forming the crest of the dam. When more water is to be passed one or more of the upper gates are partly or wholly raised. When all the water is to be passed, in extreme flood or during the winter, all the gates are raised and both gates and frames, which have a pin joint connection with the chord, are swung to a horizontal position under the bridge floor.

At the time of making the 1900 preliminary survey two routes were considered in the vicinity of Savannah. This village stands on what is known as Crusoe island, which is not an island at all but is high, hard land, several miles in circumference, surrounded by low, marshy land. The route chosen crossed this so-called island and was direct but it necessitated deep excavation and passed through the business portion of Savannah, cutting the village off from railroad communication except by a bridge upon the main street and doing considerable damage to property. The route circling the northerly end of the island was a mile and a quarter longer but much cheaper. The original Barge canal law distinctly prescribed the course of the canal at this point. In his annual report for 1904, however, State Engineer Van Alstyne again raised the question, summing it up in this manner, "Is it worth $250,000 to save twenty-five minutes of the time required to make a trip from Buffalo to Albany?" The law was explicit in stipulating the reasons for which the State Engineer might make changes in canal alignment and it was conceded that this case did not come under the provision. But it is doubtful if a change would have been made here, had not a new question entered into the consideration -- two new questions, in fact, one embracing an alteration in alignment of much wider scope and the other involving nothing less than the addition of another canal, the Cayuga and Seneca, to the Barge system. In the final solution the line of the canal for many miles in this vicinity was pushed away to the south, far from Savannah or its environs.

One of the laws of 1905 (chapter 700) directed the State Engineer to survey for a canal between the Barge canal and Cayuga lake. Back in 1900 the State Committee on Canals had recommended that the Cayuga and Seneca and the Black River canals be retained as navigable feeders but not enlarged and all through the agitation this suggestion had been followed and these two canals had been kept out of the discussion. But now, before construction had more than begun, came this first move toward adding another branch to the system, the Cayuga and Seneca canal. Later there were more or less serious attempts to make nine other additions, these being the abandoned Chemung canal, an extension of the Black River canal, the Glens Falls feeder, a branch from the Seneca river to Auburn, a section from Tonawanda to Buffalo and canals between Flushing bay and Jamaica bay, and Jamaica bay and Peconic bay. Of all the proposed additions to the original Barge canal system, only that of the Cayuga and Seneca canal has been effected and this was not accomplished until 1909. We are not at present directly concerned with the new branch but rather with the change made in the Erie canal in anticipation of its eventual inclusion.

In reporting on the survey to Cayuga lake State Engineer Van Alstyne said that the question had arisen in this connection whether by changing the route of the main canal, bringing it closer to Cayuga lake, a location better in some respects than the one chosen might not result and at the same time provision made for a cheaper connection with Cayuga and Seneca lakes. This proposed change in alignment was of considerable length, from Fox Ridge to Lyons, nearly twenty-five miles by the new line, some eight miles more than the old line, but it lay largely in river channels, where the cost of both construction and maintenance would be lessened, where the wider channel would give increased safety and ease to navigation and where seepage and the consequent damage to adjacent property would be minimized and all the water-supply of the region would become available. These and other advantages were such as to cause the continuation of the study on this subject until plans had been sufficiently developed along both lines to know of a certainty the good points and the cost of each.

The movement to provide for a direct connection between the Barge canal and the Cayuga and Seneca canal had a marked effect in deciding the question of altering the alignment of the trunk line. The people of the Cayuga and Seneca valleys were getting back of the agitation and bringing strong arguments to reinforce their claims. Unless conditions were changed the only connection with the Cayuga and Seneca branch after the new canal should be completed would be by way of the existing Erie canal from Montezuma to Syracuse and thence down the existing Oswego canal to its junction with the Seneca river a little below the foot of Onondaga lake. But the details of the survey of 1905 need not be given till the addition of the Cayuga and Seneca canal is discussed as a distinct project. This survey, it will be noticed, contemplated a spur only to Cayuga lake. The scheme for enlarging the whole extent of the Cayuga and Seneca canal did not develop until later.

The problem of a new course for the Erie canal, however, advanced steadily to a final solution. On January 15, 1906, the Advisory Board had held a public hearing on the question, attended by representatives from a full dozen commercial bodies and canal organizations. In this manner the sentiment of business and canal interests was obtained and in general it proved favorable to the change, but Savannah objected. Although the new arrangement would avoid injuring the town it would take the canal entirely away and quite naturally the people preferred the canal and its benefits to a few slight inconveniences and property damages, for which they would be financially compensated.

By March 27, 1907, we find the State Engineer, Frederick Skene, presenting to the Canal Board estimates on the two routes and submitting to that body the question of making the change. In the extended study given to the subject it had seemed best to make certain changes in alignment still farther to the west and so these estimates cover the distance from Fox Ridge to Macedon, 34.74 miles by the Savannah route and 42.82 miles by the "south" or "low level" line. The estimate along the course established by the law was $9,373,000, and by the new route, $7,836,000, a prospective saving of $1,537,000. The Canal Board ordered a committee to draft a bill to authorize the change and a little later, during the current session, the Legislature amended the original law (chapter 710, Laws of 1907) so as to allow the new alignment to go into effect.

It was two years earlier, however, that the first radical change in the Barge canal law had been made, but in following topically various early studies by the engineers we have deferred the consideration of this subject until now. This change was an amendment (chapter 740, Laws of 1905) which was so worded as to allow making the locks of a larger size. The original law said, "The locks shall have the following governing dimensions: Length between hollow quoins, three hundred and twenty-eight feet, clear width twenty-eight feet, minimum depth in lock chamber and on mitre sills eleven feet." The amendment inserted the word "minimum" before the words "length" and "width," thus making each of the three dimensions minimum dimensions, not definitely specifying them. In this manner the Legislature had evaded the responsibility of fixing the new dimensions, passing it on rather to others, and those upon whom it fell were the members of the Canal Board. It might naturally be supposed that the State Engineer and the Advisory Board of Consulting Engineers were better qualified to pass upon this subject; at least they were the officials who had given it greatest thought and knew the most about it, but since the Canal Board must approve all plans before any construction work could be undertaken, the final decision of this question really devolved upon that body. It happened that in this instance there were marked differences of opinion. The State Engineer and the Advisory Board desired to increase both the width and the depth, but the majority of the Canal Board were opposed to the increase in depth and of course their opinion prevailed.

After passage of this amendment the first official step toward reaching a decision was taken by the Canal Association of Greater New York. Within a few days the Canal Board and the State Engineer received letters transmitting resolutions adopted by this association urging the State officials to make the new locks at least 45 feet wide and 14 feet deep, saying that the exigencies of commerce and traffic called for such enlargement and that by so doing the canals would be placed on a par with the best equipped waterways of the world. The Canal Board in turn requested the State Engineer to obtain the opinion of the Advisory Board on the subject. This he did and the reply of the Consulting Engineers is worth examining. It was in the form of a rather extended resolution, the gist of which was that the locks on existing Canadian canals were 45 feet wide and 14 feet deep and a prospective Canadian waterway would have locks at least as large; that a proposed canal from Lake Erie to the Ohio river would be 15 feet deep and have locks 45 feet wide and proposed navigation on the Illinois and Mississippi rivers would be 14 feet deep; that European countries, appreciative of the advantages of standard canal dimensions, were working toward that end; that the contemplated enlargement would decrease cost of transportation both by increasing tonnage of vessels and, because of greater depth, by reducing tractive force; that it would enable the Barge canal better to compete with rival water and rail routes and might be to the advantage of such barge owners as contemplated the use of their barges in coastwise traffic during the winter; that 76 per cent of the total Barge canal length lay in the open waters of rivers or lake and much of the remaining 24 per cent was wide enough for two boats of 43 feet beam to pass and plans could be so drawn as to make easy the widening of the rest and also the deepening of the whole channel to 14 feet when traffic required; that the additional cost of larger locks could be met without overrunning the money appropriated; that the contemplated water-supply was sufficient for locks of increased size, and therefore the Board was of the opinion that the locks should be 45 feet clear width and have 14 feet depth of water over the miter-sills.

It chanced that, when this measure became law, contracts had already been let for building three locks. The plans for these called for 28 feet width and 12 feet depth. As we have said, State Engineer Van Alstyne desired to increase these dimensions to 45 and 14 feet and in this stand he was backed by the Advisory Board, but to do this it was necessary to make alterations to the plans then under contract and also to have future plans containing these new dimensions approved by the Canal Board. The law provided that no alterations could be made without the consent and approval of the Superintendent of Public Works and State Engineer. Mr. Van Alstyne new that Superintendent Franchot would not consent to a depth greater than 12 feet and he knew too that the majority of the Canal Board was also opposed to increasing the depth. Therefore he did not attempt to bring the question to an issue, but he made vary plain his own position in the matter, going on record in his annual report of 1905 and publishing a complete account of the transactions.

The dimensions of the locks as fixed at that time are those upon which these structures have been built -- 45 feet wide, with 12 feet of water over the sills. Under the amendment the length also might have been increased, but there never developed any reason for doing this, except that as a matter of fact the locks are actually more than 328 feet long between the hollow quoins, ranging from about 338 to 343 feet. This dimension, however, is a mere detail of design; the length in the lock chamber available for boats has not been increased beyond the original intention but to allow for the swing of the gates and other necessities a greater distance between the gates was found essential.

At the beginning of Barge canal planning the State Engineer adopted a certain policy which the future may reveal as of great advantage to the State but which is scarcely known by any one except the engineers. Past experience has taught the wisdom of anticipating possible channel enlargements and so provision was made for increasing the minimum bottom width from 75 to 110 feet without unnecessarily having to undo what was then being done. The structures spanning the canal were built to fit this plan and excavated material was placed where it would not have to be rehandled in case of a future widening. Also sufficient right of way was acquired for such a contingency.

A study made during the second year of Barge canal activities was the beginning of an effort which eventually saved for the State about a million dollars. It will be recalled that when State Engineer Bond revised his estimates in response to a request from the 1903 Legislature he added an amount for work in the Hudson river from Troy to Waterford and in the Niagara river from Tonawanda to Buffalo. This he did lest the Federal government should not take upon itself the improvement of these stretches, as had been assumed when the earlier estimate was made. This amount was $1,403,307. The respective portions according to 1901 prices were $737,683 for the Hudson and $538,051 for the Niagara. When surveys for making plans were begun, after the approval of the referendum, the engineers gave little attention to these sections, hoping that the United States would undertake the task. And the hope was well founded, for the river and harbor act of 1905 contained an item authorizing the expenditure of seven hundred thousand dollars for improving the harbor and channel at Black Rock and for constructing a ship canal around the upper rapid of the Niagara at Black Rock. This act seemed definitely to commit the Federal government to the improvement of the Niagara river from Buffalo to Tonawanda and such in fact has proved the case. Except for terminal construction at Buffalo the State has not had to do anything beyond the entrance into the Niagara river at Tonawanda. This same act contained also an item which authorized the Chief of Engineers to make a survey and an estimate of cost for improving the Hudson river between the Congress street bridge, Troy, and the eastern terminus of the Barge canal at Waterford.

In addition to furnishing the United States engineers with all pertinent data in his possession and urging them to speed their investigations, in order that if possible the next river and harbor bill might include an appropriation to extend the 12-foot channel (which the Government had already excavated to Troy) as far up the Hudson as Waterford and possibly to Northumberland, State Engineer Van Alstyne caused to be made a study of the reasons why the Federal authorities should assume this task. The results of this study he published in his annual report for 1905 and also in pamphlet form. So conclusive are the arguments in this monograph and so almost amazing are some of the facts disclosed that we must examine it with considerable care and at some length.

The policy of the United States toward purely natural waterways and even toward occasional artificial canals, this study points out, is well defined, both by the words of Government officials and also by precedent from the time of the first river and harbor bills to the present day, and that policy emphatically declares the obligation of the central Government to establish and maintain the improved natural waterways where these improvements are obviously needed by large public interests and are sought by commercial movements of a magnitude sufficient to warrant the expenditure. The right to regulate commerce entails the responsibility of providing for that commerce. Thus New York, in respectful recognition of the Federal government's authority over its rivers and harbors, was seeking the expenditure of a moderate sum upon one of the greatest natural waterways of the country.

Moreover the proposition for a canal entirely across New York state had long been a favorite theme with the National government and in its surveys three routes had been considered -- one from Lake Erie to the Hudson, another from Lake Ontario to the Hudson and the third from the St. Lawrence through Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson to the head of navigation at Troy. In spite of the magnitude of the task New York State had now begun a great canal along not only one but all three of the routes projected by the United States government, and thus was simply executing the plans proposed by the Federal authorities and taking upon itself a work which, together with the Panama and a very few other canals, had been deemed worthy of weighty and costly consideration by the National government.

If the canalization of the Hudson should be considered apart from the great system of State canals, the Government still had the strongest reason for extending its aid, since it had long before adopted the Hudson river up to the State dam at Troy as its own, having maintained and committed itself to the preservation of a navigable channel 12 feet deep northward to that point. Moreover that river presented the spectacle of being one of the mightiest watercourses to penetrate the interior of our country, bearing at that time a traffic of but little less than twenty million tons yearly and having exercised, perhaps, more of an influence upon our nation's history and welfare than any other.

In addition the project afforded an opportunity for the Federal government to extend its aid to an inland section cut off of necessity from participation in many of the privileges of the coast and the appropriations therefor. In this section lay Vermont, the only state north of Mason and Dixon's line and east of the Mississippi river which has no frontage on either the Great Lakes or the ocean and therefore is entirely dependent on an artificial outlet. As an international waterway the general Government might therefore well afford to lend a helping hand, especially since Vermont had had a very meager allotment from the river and harbor expenditures of the nation.

That the waterway up the Hudson river and across to Lake Champlain was by no means exclusively for the interest of the port or the state of New York the study clearly proved. The records of export trade of the five leading Atlantic ports of North America -- New York, Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Montreal -- sounded an unmistakable note of warning was that Montreal, as a rising competitor, was no mere illusion. Of these five great Atlantic ports, the Canadian metropolis had doubled its proportion of the total export trade in the preceding twenty-five years, its trade having grown steadily and rapidly all through that time and continued uninterruptedly throughout the decline experienced by the other four ports during the last half decade of the period. Evidently the United States had somewhere been negligent in its effort to hold the export trade from the interior, and apparently too the Canadian government was actively reaping the benefits of its liberal canal policy.

The strongest argument, perhaps, for the central Government coming to the aid of New York lay in the comparison between the amount of foreign commerce passing through New York and the proportion of Federal expenditures which the state was receiving. And this argument, by the way, applies and has been used with still greater force in attempts to persuade the Federal authorities to improve the New York port facilities for handling the vast amount of export and import commerce that passes every year through that harbor. In 1904 the combined export and import trade of New York state was practically equal to the sum total of all the combined export and import trade of the remaining 90 per cent (by population) of the United States, and yet this State received as a return benefit with which to maintain its facilities for handling its immense contribution to the commerce of the country only 7 1/2 per cent of the total expenditures for river and harbor improvement. A review of the records for the preceding decade told the same story for each year, except that generally New York's share of commerce had been a little more than half that of the whole country. Moreover New York had never had more than about the same percentage of Federal aid. Of the total appropriations for river and harbor improvement from 1802 to 1904, inclusive, which amounted to a trifle less than a half billion dollars, New York has received only 7 1/4 per cent, and the inclusion of projects along the New Jersey and Vermont boundaries did not materially alter the proportion. The monograph pointedly asks, "If, as a Federal statesman has said, 'The General Government improves channels and harbors and imposes a charge upon commerce with a view to obtaining compensation for the improvements,' is it right that a State furnishing, as did New York in 1904, sixty-four per cent of the imports of the Union, the item upon which this 'charge' is based, should yet recover less than eight per cent of the resulting expenditure for 'improvement'?"

Viewing the question from various angles the study showed that New York had commercial interests comparable with those of any foreign nation and that in the volume of her traffic per capita she was surpassed by only one people on the face of the earth. Also that the State, while it constituted an important part of the country, still possessed a far smaller proportion of the population, wealth and income of the United States than it furnished of the commerce and therefore had need of the assistance of the Federal government, to which it turns over all the revenues of its foreign trade. The meagerness of the allotments to New York was emphasized by a table in the 1904 report of the Department of Commerce and Labor, which showed the quantity of freight handled on seven of the leading waterways of the country and also the total United States appropriations for each from 1802 to 1900. No Federal aid had been extended to New York canals and yet they, even at that low tide of their career, were carrying a traffic second only to that of the Monongahela river, the leading waterway of the table, and 85 per cent of the tonnage on the Monongahela was simply coal floated downstream. Moreover the Hudson river, which was not included in this Federal report, was carrying twice as large a traffic as the Monongahela.

New York's appeal called attention to the significant fact that in the great continuous chain of waterways which reach from the Atlantic coast through to the western extremity of Lake Superior that portion across New York state from the Hudson to Lake Erie was the only link for which the Federal government had not expended its millions, and yet that portion -- even for the freight going all or in part by rail -- was the key to all the rest of the route, the key, in the language of the Twelfth Census, to the "greatest internal waterway in the world, having a ton mileage equal to nearly 40 per cent of that of the entire railroad system of the United States."

The study revealed some striking facts in regard to State expenditures and Federal appropriations for rivers and harbors. Considering national appropriations on the basis of distribution according to population it was discovered that during the preceding decade New York had received $1.69 per capita while the per capita expenditure for the whole country was $2.33. Applying the same test to the total appropriations from 1802 to 1904, the expenditures for New York and the United States, respectively, were $4.66 and $6.16 per capita of the population in 1900. Compared with other states it appeared that whereas New York had received aid to the extend of $3.92 per capita between 1802 and 1900 some of the western states, which had been settled during the last half of that period, had secured much larger amounts, as for instance Oregon and California, whose shares were $6.73 and $6.19, respectively. Although New York is the only state with both lake and ocean frontage to consume its appropriation, other states had fared much better. Wisconsin had had $5.32, Maine $7.28, Florida $8.76, Texas $5.07, Michigan $10.18, Rhode Island $8.24, Maryland $4.33, South Carolina $5.34 and West Virginia $5.18.

On the other hand New York, although she had always felt that the through routes of communication she had provided to the interior merited some share of national consideration, upon being refused, had again and again bent herself heroically to the task, alone and unaided, and had already spent on her canals a sum amounting to $29.30 per capita of her 1900 population and had begun a new enterprise which would increase the amount to $43.19 per capita. The Government aid she was now requesting for both the Hudson and the Niagara projects was but 98 cents per capita of state population, or nine cents per capita of the population of the whole country. In comparison it was seen that France had expended $20.45 per capita in the improvement of rivers and harbors. All Europe in recent years and with remarkable unanimity had awakened to the demands and the benefits of water transportation for the interior, and in England, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia and Austria vast sums were being spent in extending and improving navigable waterways and connected harbors. New York's next door neighbor, Canada, had spent no less than $18.62 per capita of her present population and also then had under way projects which would double this sum, assuring a per capita expenditure of $37.24. That New York, almost single-handed, should be called upon to contest these extensive outlays, made for the immediate and avowed purpose of diverting the interior traffic from United States to Canadian channels, was -- whether just or unjust -- the existing situation.

It appeared , in short, that the 10 per cent of the population of the United States composing the state of New York was charged with the expense of accommodating 50 per cent of the foreign trade, the receipts for which it turned over to the general Government, and that in return it was assisted by that Government to the extent of just about 7 per cent of the total moneys appropriated for harbor and river improvement for the utilization of the commerce of the realm.

And again, "Will the Congress consider what would have been lost to the United States had not the New York canals been constructed? Will that distinguished body reflect what assured national benefits would have been impugned had the State Government and the people lately yielded to the clamor of the many who urged the abandonment rather than the renovation of the system and the expenditure of another hundred million of dollars? And will it refuse the well deserved assistance, because, forsooth, it knows the community has energetically made up its mind to prosecute this beneficent international undertaking, even though it should have to stagger under the weight of other men's burdens?"

The general Government had already in effect pledged itself to the consummation of the Niagara project and this work was duly carried on to completion. Later, in deference to New York's appeal, it undertook also the Hudson river project but not until several years had elapsed, and then various complications arose still further to delay the beginning of construction work. We shall therefore suspend consideration of this subject until the appropriate time is reached.

We have seen that by the Barge canal act there was created a body called the Advisory Board of Consulting Engineers. The members were appointed by the Governor and it was their duty, paraphrasing the law, to advise the State Engineer and the Superintendent of Public Works, to follow the progress of the work and from time to time report to the Governor, the State Engineer and the Superintendent of Public Works as these officials might require or as the Board itself might deem proper and advisable. Before canal plans had much more than begun an additional act of the Legislature (chapter 200, Laws of 1904) provided that the terms of office of these advisory engineers should continue during the period of canal construction.

An important feature of Barge canal construction, one that is now recognized as perhaps the most vital of all to the success of the venture but which was overlooked in the early stages of the project -- the providing of suitable terminals together with their accompanying freight-handling machinery and other facilities -- was first given official cognizance during the period we have recently been considering. In its first report to the Governor, which covered the activities of 1904 and 1905, the Advisory Board of Consulting Engineers says that the question of terminals at Tonawanda or Buffalo and at New York city had been brought to the attention of the Board by various commercial organizations interested in the canal and had been emphasized by statistics presented at a hearing before the Congressional Committee on Rivers and Harbors when Federal aid was being sought for the canal in the Niagara river at the rapids at Black Rock, between Buffalo and Tonawanda. But it was not until 1909 that any effective action was taken to supply the canal with terminals and so this subject too will be deferred to a later time.

A question of policy which came up after construction work had been progressing for several years was that of changing the type of bridges on certain portions of the canal. A commission was appointed in 1909 to study the subject to which we referred in the preceding paragraph, that of terminals, and it was a recommendation of this commission which led to this change in bridges. In a preliminary report to the Legislature in 1910 the commission urged the amending of the Barge canal law so as to provide for bridges over the canalized Tonawanda creek which would leave an unobstructed channel for the passage of masted vessels, it being essential in the terminal development at the western end of the Barge canal to bring vessels having masts or funnels into the lower reach of that stream, where direct transfer might be made to canal barges. The original law required that all fixed and lift bridges should be at such a height as to give a clear passageway of not less that 15 1/2 feet between the bridge and the water at its highest ordinary navigable stage. The desired amendment, duly passed by the Legislature in 1910, added the words, "When approved by the state engineer and surveyor and approved by the canal board bascule or swing bridges may be constructed."

But the provisions of this amendment could be invoked at any point on the canal and almost immediately Syracuse took advantage of this privilege and sought to have the new type installed on the section of channel lying between its harbor and Lake Ontario, a stretch comprising the whole of the Oswego canal, a portion of the Erie branch and the spur through Onondaga lake to the city. The object of course was to bring Great Lakes boats to the wharves at Syracuse, and bridges giving unlimited headroom were essential to the attainment. The project was largely agitated locally and had the backing of the commercial authorities of the city. A bill ordering this change was introduced in the Legislature in 1910, but it failed and what was really accomplished was the passage of a concurrent resolution directing the Terminal Commission to investigate the subject and report to the Legislature in 1911. The Commission studied the question carefully and reported that the cost of changing all the bridges except those between Onondaga lake and the proposed Syracuse harbor would cost about $520,000 and a capitalization of a half million more would be needed for maintenance and operation. Between Onondaga lake and the Syracuse harbor extensive railroad freight yards presented a complex problem, which could not be solved in conformity with the desired change for less than $750,000. The commission was of the opinion that the benefits to be derived by either Syracuse or the State were not commensurate with the expenditure of the million and three-quarters involved. Moreover some of the bridges had been or were being raised or altered to the 15 1/2-foot requirement and others were already at a height to need no reconstruction. There were four bridges, however, which were still to be rebuilt and as the additional cost would not be large the commission recommended that they be constructed so as to be capable of being transformed later into swing or bascule bridges without the sacrifice of any of the original cost.

A little later Syracuse petitioned the Canal Board to make the bridges over the Oswego canal of the movable type and the Board subsequently acceded to the request. In the minutes of the Canal Board proceedings for September 27, 1911, may be found the record of the State Engineer's recommendation that all new bridges to be constructed over the Erie canal in the vicinity of Tonawanda or over the Oswego canal be either bascule bridges or of a type convertible into bascule bridges; also the Board's resolution approving this type of construction. As a result the four bridges on the Oswego branch have been made of the convertible type, as it has been called, and others not at the time contemplated are bascule or swing bridges.

An interesting side-light in this report of the Terminal Commission is the admonitory addendum urging that all further inroads upon the Barge canal funds be peremptorily stopped. It seemed probable that the whole project would be completed within the appropriation and therefore it should not be permitted, said the Commission, that any obstacle should be thrown in the way of so desirable a consummation. The immediate occasion of this warning to the Legislature was the attempt of Syracuse to have the change of bridge type ordered by legislative action without special appropriation being made for the specific purpose. The canal appropriation had already been taxed with burdens it was not originally intended to bear and this was but one of several attempts to do the same thing again.